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1. Introduction: The role for Farmer Organizations in 
the Provision of Extension and Advisory Services  
The involvement of farmer organizations (FOs) in the 
provision of extension and advisory services (EAS) has been 
identified as a solution to the limitations of the hierarchical 
public sector extension system and market-driven private 
sector extension systems (Mercoiret et al., 1997; Stockbridge, 
2003). Previous studies have noted that producer organiza-
tions (POs) are major actors in EAS systems, and that this 
leads to better orientation of the services (Swanson, 2006). 
However, although producer organizations are active in 
numerous industrialized and developing countries, studies 
examining the role of these organizations in the provision of 
EAS remain scarce. The conditions under which FOs provide 
well-suited, accessible and sustainable EAS to smallholder 
farmers still need to be identified (Faure et al., 2011).  
This case study explores and compares two experimental 
projects conducted with cotton inter-professional 
associations (UNPCB, UPPC and UDPC)1 in Burkina Faso: one 
project in association with the major cotton firm (Sofitex) in 
the region and financed by Agence Française de 
Développement (AFD), and the other promoted by SNV 
World (a Dutch development organization), independent of 
the cotton sub-sector. Both projects focused on testing an 
advisory approach called management advice to family farms 
(MAFF, see Box 1), which has been designed with the support 
of researchers (Faure & Kleene, 2004).  
MAFF pilot projects have been instructive in demonstrating 
that, in a context where FOs are weak, the first benefit of the 
approach is to strengthen the FOs’ own capacities, before 
achieving meaningful and sustainable results at the farm 
level. Where there are weaknesses in the FOs, funding and 
operating partners can assist and thus significantly influence 
the design (content, objectives and governance) of EAS. But 
                                                          
1
 These are respectively the national, provincial and department-
al cotton producers’ unions (s). “Departmental” here refers to 
the smallest geographic and administrative territory, equivalent 
to a municipality. 
FOs then encounter difficulties in appropriating, adapting and 
scaling-up this new approach by themselves.  
Figure 1: Harvested cotton. © UNPCB 
In the case presented in this study, the scheme to co-manage 
EAS between Sofitex (the cotton firm) and UNPCB (the 
National Union of Cotton Growers of Burkina) led the latter 
to disconnect from its own membership and turn away from 
its original goals. In the end, the absence of tangible gains for 
Sofitex and emergent contradictions within UNPCB drove 
these two entities to split up and each establish their own 
EAS services. While Sofitex managed easily to redesign a 
“best fit” approach adapted to its own needs, UNPCB 
struggled with how to design advisory services to serve the 
divergent objectives of its members. On the one hand, EAS 
have to facilitate farmers’ development in the context of the 
commercialization of cotton and, on the other hand, they 
have to unlock a household system based on cotton 
production in order to increase farmers’ incomes and 
broaden development opportunities. Within the SNV project, 
whereas MAFF services meshed well with FOs’ skills and 
objectives, the internal financial resources available were 
insufficient to maintain and scale-up these services beyond 
the duration and initial set of farmers participating in the 
project.  
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Box 1: Management advice to family farms (MAFF) 
MAFF projects have sought to promote the provision of 
comprehensive advice to farmers. Faure & Kleene (2004) 
highlighted the five main principles that distinguish MAFF 
from other extension and advisory services:  
1. MAFF is a holistic approach that allows the producer 
and his or her family to analyze their situation, plan, 
take decisions, monitor their activities and evaluate 
results; it encompasses the technical, economic and 
social aspects of their activities. 
2. MAFF is a process of strengthening farmers’ capacity to 
master various aspects of their activities (i.e., 
agricultural production and other income-generating 
activities, organization of work, management of cash 
flow, etc.) in order to achieve various family objectives. 
It is a matter of placing rural families at the very center 
of the advisory function. 
3. MAFF is based on participatory learning methods 
(including training, exchange of experiences, promotion 
and use  of indigenous knowledge, etc.) and support for 
decision-making (using various tools, such as “techno-
economic” monitoring of production, calculation of 
gross margins, cash management, etc.), which are 
based to a large extent on numeracy and literacy. 
4. MAFF implementation fits into farmers’ realities: 
farmers involved in these approaches participate in 
networks for the exchange of technical and local 
knowledge, and they are often members – or even 
office holders – of producer organizations. 
5. MAFF projects aim at building mechanisms for 
supporting producers with strong participation of POs 
and possible involvement of new actors, such as 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or consultants. 
They seek to empower farmers and their organizations 
in their interactions with other actors. 
These experiences raise questions about the paths that need 
to be taken to simultaneously improve FOs’ capacities (so 
that they can fully undertake their roles) and expand their 
activities to include advisory services, while also designing 
innovative governance and funding schemes that allow for 
scaling-up and financial sustainability. 
For nearly a decade, several FOs in Burkina Faso have tried 
out the MAFF approach with the support of foreign aid. 
These pilot projects have been implemented on the 
periphery of national systems and the private sector, thereby 
further increasing the difficulty of ensuring the long-term 
sustainability of EAS without embedding them within 
national dynamics and structures. Nevertheless, these pilots 
have been seen as pioneering experiments in a context 
where policymakers and international donors have recently 
sought to renew and modernize EAS at the national level (see 
Box 2). 
Box 2: Institutional context of provision of advisory services 
in Burkina Faso 
The institutional and legal context shapes the process by 
which FOs evolve. More importantly, this context determines 
how demand-driven advisory services can be fulfilled.  
Legal status of FOs and implications for delivery of advisory 
services  
In Burkina Faso, two laws govern rural organizations: Law 14 
for cooperatives (1999) and Law 10 for associations (1992). 
FOs are strongly encouraged to incorporate themselves in 
compliance with Law 14, following the economic role 
accorded to them by the state. However, numerous 
grassroots groups retain the status of associations, or even 
informal associations (i.e., they may be awaiting an 
opportunity to become formal or may lack the ability or 
willingness to register for formal status). 
According to Law 14, cooperative and pre-cooperative groups 
with economic goals must operate within a specific sub-
sector (e.g., cotton). In a context where farms rely on 
multiple activities, FOs tend to provide services for the 
different agricultural products, and not limit themselves in 
targeting EAS for a specific crop. Law 14, therefore, is aligned 
with the interests of only a few groups. 
Law 14 makes it difficult to implement EAS under an 
approach such as MAFF where service provision is 
disconnected from a value chain focus. Because of possible 
contradictions with Law 14, elected FO representatives have 
avoided direct EAS provisioning that deal with diversification 
or more comprehensive issues at the farm level. They tend to 
let external projects implement such experimental efforts. In 
these cases, FOs act as executive partners, or as local NGOs 
working under contract.  
The emergence of a national system for agricultural 
advisory services 
After several years of reflection based on a diagnosis of the 
existing advisory system, the Government of Burkina Faso 
adopted a National System for Agricultural Extension and 
Advisory Services (known by its French abbreviation, 
SNVACA) in 2010. The main goal of the SNVACA is to better 
respond to farmers’ needs by rationalizing the methods used 
and the support provided by all actors involved (including 
private and public advisors, FOs and NGOs). New funding 
opportunities were establishment through national 
development funds and contracting mechanisms, financed by 
the state and/or funding agencies within specific sub-sectors. 
Services can then be implemented by public or private 
providers or by FOs, but specific conditions must be met. In 
particular, as far as FOs are concerned, SNVACA mentions the 
necessity of “transparency, good governance, 
professionalism and enhanced technical, organizational and 
financial capacities”. If conformity with Law 14 and the 
Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa 
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(the OHADA law) are enforced, this would lead to a drastic 
reduction in the number of FOs that are able to provide EAS. 
In the SNVACA report, FOs appear as EAS beneficiaries rather 
than as EAS providers. They are listed as part of the targeted 
public, along with smallholders, specialized producers and 
those involved in agribusiness. The operational system 
proposed is based on public extension agents using multiple 
methods e.g., farmer field school, MAFF, participative 
development of new technologies, model farms. The 
activities of FOs would be restricted to project execution, and 
only in relation to a specific sub-sector.  
So far, 900 extension agents have been recruited by the 
government to support implementation of the SNVACA. FOs 
using the MAFF approach fear that their experience will not 
be taken into account and describe vague implementation 
modalities. They would like to have a more prominent role in 
the implementation of SNVACA, but they do not have 
sufficient proof of their capability to deliver sustainable EAS. 
A lot of work remains to be done to clarify the status and 
roles of extension agents within specific sub-sectors.  
 
2. Case History 
The story of EAS provided by cotton producer organizations 
(CPOs) in Burkina Faso takes place within the larger historical 
context of MAFF pilot efforts, FO empowerment in West 
Africa, and the reform of the Burkinabe cotton sector. 
To get to the bottom of this story, we reviewed existing 
evidence linking the ability of CPOs to provide advisory 
services to five factors that are considered key drivers (Faure 
et al., 2011): funding mechanisms; external partnerships and 
institutional arrangements; power relationships between 
stakeholders; motivations and objectives of each partners; 
and available skills and methods used. The comparison 
between two projects using the MAFF approach with CPOs 
allowed us to distinguish difficulties that arose from the 
approach itself from those difficulties related to the 
institutional context or the CPOs’ capacities. 
2.1 The predominant role of research in the design and 
pilot testing of MAFF 
The MAFF approach evolved out of several research projects 
undertaken in West Africa (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, 
Niger and Senegal) beginning in the 1970s. It was born out of 
a desire to take into account existing farming practices and 
rural realities, with a focus on the management process at 
the farm level. At the time, EAS that focused on technical 
production information was considered to be the best 
solution for rural development, since farmers’ lack of 
technical knowledge was identified as the primary problem. 
The MAFF approach put forward the view that it was the lack 
of managerial knowledge that was more significant 
(Moumouni et al., 2011). 
MAFF pilot projects were conducted with French support for 
nearly two decades in many francophone African countries. 
Support from various cooperative efforts (with the French, 
Dutch, Swiss and Belgian governments) has also helped to 
test and adapt the MAFF approach to different contexts. 
Although farmers are unanimously enthusiastic about the 
positive impacts of MAFF projects, financial sustainability and 
scaling-up implementation remain challenges. 
2.2 The empowerment of farmer organizations 
After the withdrawal of the state from agricultural EAS in the 
1990s, economic services (i.e., marketing, supply of inputs) 
were entrusted to private firms, civil society, NGOs and FOs. 
While FOs were previously subordinate to state interests, 
since the 1990s they have become more self-reliant and 
autonomous in driving their own development. 
Private firms provided agricultural EAS only in geographic 
areas where production was clearly profitable, such as in 
cotton-growing zones, in order to minimize investment risks. 
Outside of these areas FOs became privileged interlocutors, 
engaging directly with donors and NGOs, to implement new 
EAS efforts in neglected regions. It was in this context that 
the MAFF approach was introduced in Burkina Faso. 
Box 3: The creation of UNPCB and Sofitex 
Under the French colonial regime, cotton cultivation 
underwent massive expansion due to compulsory sowing. In 
1947, the cotton sector was reorganized based on farmers’ 
voluntary participation. The omnipotent region-wide 
Compagnie Française pour le Développement des Fibres 
Textiles (CFDT) took charge of the purchase and distribution 
of inputs and the sale of cotton output from francophone 
African countries on the international market, as well as the 
promotion of strong agronomic research and extension. 
When the countries became independent from France, very 
little changed. In Burkina Faso, CFDT was replaced in 1979 by 
a new parastatal named Sofitex (Société Burkinabé des Fibres 
Textiles), but it was partially owned by CFDT and the basic 
state-led model remained unchanged. 
Through this period, farmers were progressively organized 
under a cooperative model through multi-purpose village 
groups, called groupements villageois (GVs), which enabled 
farmers to self-manage their cotton marketing to Sofitex and 
to access input credit through village-level joint-liability 
schemes. 
Falling international prices at the beginning of the 1990s and 
large debts accumulated by GVs led to drops in production 
and to the reform of the cotton sector. Both the government 
and the donors involved in the sector – essentially AFD and 
the World Bank – agreed that, given the importance of the 
sector, there was an urgent need to push for reforms. 
The growing empowerment of independent farmer 
organizations, led the government to seek to minimize the 
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political risks of reform by establishing a more (government-) 
friendly union, and thus promoted the formation of a new 
National Union of Cotton Producers of Burkina (UNPCB). 
Establishment of cotton cooperatives and UNPCB received 
support for the  AFD financed capacity-building programs. It 
took five years to persuade Sofitex and producer representa-
tives that reforms were in their best interests, and to reach a 
consensus among national stakeholders on the content of 
the reform. The first stage of reform focused on 
strengthening the capacities of farmer organizations. In 1996, 
the GVs, of which membership was obligatory for farmers, 
were replaced by market-oriented groups comprised solely of 
cotton farmers (i.e., cotton producers groups, known as 
GPCs) with voluntary membership. Since these groups were 
self-selected, they relied more on members’ social capital 
and ability to monitor each other than formal management 
structures. 
With the reorganization of farmer groups underway, reform 
efforts focused on introducing competitive pressures in the 
sector. Regional monopolies were granted to private firms 
engaged in the cotton market, input supply and 
transportation. The cotton production area was divided into 
three parts assigned to three different companies: Sofitex, 
Socoma and Fasocoton (see Figure 3). In 2006, an inter-
professional committee was created to work with those 
three companies, UNPCB and other key market players. This 
committee deals with EAS, training of producers, credit 
funding, input supply, cotton seeds and fiber marketing, and 
research funding. 
Mechanisms for refunds to UNPCB 
Cotton firms refund UNPCB on the basis of 750 CFA francs 
per tonne of commercialized cotton, broken down as follows: 
250 CFA francs/tonne per departmental union, 250 CFA 
francs/tonne per provincial union, and 250 CFA francs/tonne 
for the national union (representing approximately €350,000 
for 300,000 tonnes annually). In addition to this allowance, 
commissions on cotton sales are paid directly to GPCs (3500 
CFA francs/tonne). 
The European Union (EU) and AFD also provided substantial 
resources to implement the reforms and donated 
warehouses, offices, vehicles, computers, and other items to 
CPOs. In this way, UNPCB was able to use its own funds to 
recruit technicians and pay allowances to its elected 
representatives. 
Source: Adapted from Kaminski et al., 2011. 
2.3 The role of CPOs in the MAFF pilots 
Among the wide range of FOs that pilot-tested the MAFF 
approach, the experiences of CPOs make for a particularly 
valuable case study. The MAFF pilots were implemented 
during the same period when the CPOs were being created 
and the cotton sector was undergoing reforms. CPOs were 
born out of the liberalization of private cotton companies, 
and thus have remained subordinate to these companies (see 
Box 3 on the creation of UNPCB and Sofitex). 
With CPOs and cotton firms sharing the responsibilities of 
implementing MAFF, field operations were hampered by 
problematic power relationships and divergent points of 
view. Specifically, the design of advisory services played a 
pivotal role in determining the nature of the relationships 
among family farms, private cotton firms and CPOs. This story 
is related here, divided into four chronological stages 
corresponding to the cycles of available funding and 
stakeholder motivations.  
 
Figure 2: Farmer focus group meeting. © UNPCB 
Stage 1. 1993–1996: First methodological tests with 
research support  
Agricultural research in southern Burkina Faso was primarily 
linked to the introduction and development of cotton 
production. It led logically to experimentation with EAS 
methods in order to adapt them to local contexts.  
Under the framework of the integrated rural development 
project for Houet Kossi Mouhoun Province: Phase 1 (Projet 
de développement rural intégré/Houet Kossi Mouhoun), 
financed by AFD from 1993 to 1995, the national research 
institute (Institut de l’Environnement et de Recherches 
Agricoles de Burkina Faso, INERA) and the French Agricultural 
Research Centre for International Development (Centre de 
coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour 
le Développement, CIRAD), with help from the Regional 
Centre for Agro-pastoral Promotion (CRPA), designed an 
implementation guidebook for the MAFF approach. This 
guidebook included detailed tools: a farm notebook with 
which to collect and document the main technical and 
economic data on farm production and activities; technical 
summary sheets; a guide for facilitators; and a guide on 
assessment and monitoring. These tools established the basis 
for all subsequent MAFF advisory pilots (see Table 1). 
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Figure 3: Cotton production areas in Burkina Faso and zoning of the three cotton companies (Sofitex, Fasocoton and Socoma) 
Source:  SP/SFCL January, 2005. 
 
Table 1. MAFF field activities over a crop year (front-office) 
Management 
cycle 
Before the crop year During the crop year After the crop year 
Prepare and 
decide 
Food 
security 
evaluation 
Inputs 
and crop 
rotation 
planning 
Cash flow 
forecasts 
      
Proceed     
Cover  
crops 
Fertilization 
Phyto-
sanitary 
protection 
  
Measure and 
evaluate 
   
Monitoring of 
crops 
Monitoring 
of expenses 
  
Yield and 
gross 
margins 
calculation 
Identification 
of constraints 
Train   
Monitoring 
of crops 
Measurements 
of areas 
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In 1996, data were collected in about 30 villages, after which 
the pilots ended. AFD continued with the Project for 
Providing Support to Organizations of Agricultural Producers 
(Projet d’appui aux organisations de producteurs agricoles; 
PA-OPA), which supported FOs, but without EAS. At this time, 
the training and visit (T&V) method was the preferred 
extension approach in use. The efficiency of the MAFF 
method was being debated within the AFD. 
Stage 2. 1996–2000: Focus on cotton sector liberalization 
and UNPCB creation  
UNPCB was progressively established during the period from 
1996 to 2001 with AFD support of the PA-OPA and 
simultaneous reforms of within the cotton sub-sector. 
Starting in 1996, voluntary-membership groups of local 
cotton producers (sub-village level) were introduced through 
the PA-OPA. These GPCs replaced the existing village groups 
created by market-oriented organizations, in order to wipe 
out producers’ existing debt, and were established with new 
governance rules to help avoid acquiring new debt. GPCs 
became the interface between Sofitex and the farmers for 
the purposes of exchanging technical advice, input supply, 
credit management and marketing of cottonseed.  
The newly established GPCs quickly felt the need to come 
together at higher levels of aggregation for two reasons. 
First, to improve the coordination of their services (i.e., 
information dissemination, training, and financial and 
organizational management support) and, second, to 
mediate their relationship with Sofitex.  
In 1997, the Departmental Union of Cotton Producers (Union 
Départementale des Producteurs de Coton, UDPC) was 
created, bringing together GPCs at the departmental level, 
and the Provincial Union of Cotton Producers (Union 
Provinciale des Producteurs de Coton, UPPC) grouping 
together the UDPCs at the provincial level (see Figure ). In 
1998, the provincial unions decided to create the National 
Union of Cotton Producers of Burkina Faso (Union Nationale 
des Producteurs de Coton du Burkina, UNPCB), in order to 
represent farmers within the commodity chain at the 
national level. The UNPCB became a partner of the cotton 
firm, Sofitex, in 1999, within the framework of a cotton 
sector inter-professional agreement. This agreement 
specified mechanisms for the joint management of the 
cotton sector. The government’s recognition of the farmers’ 
capacity to invest in private companies resulted in the 
transfer of state shares to FOs. In subsequent years, new 
players were introduced: private input providers, new sub-
national private cotton monopolies (Socoma and Fasocoton), 
and private transport companies. 
The UNPCB rapidly began to fulfill its role by offering 
economic services to its members and representing farmers’ 
interests. It subsequently expressed interest in developing 
EAS. However, after a feasibility study, AFD refused to 
allocate funds for the UNPCB to provide of advisory services 
to its members, citing the Union’s lack of capacity. 
Instead, AFD set up the PA-OPA to strengthen the 
professional capacities of the GPCs, and introduced 
grassroots management advisors.2 Following PA-OPA 
requirements, management advisors for credit were trained 
in order to assist GPCs in financial management. Forty-eight 
credit advisors were recruited by the UDPCs in order to 
support the 804 GPCs. The advisor’s wages were initially paid 
half by the project and half by GPCs and the UDPC, but the 
UDPC subsequently took over this responsibility completely. 
Supervisory positions were also created at the provincial level 
and supervisors were progressively paid by the UPPCs). 
Stage 3. 2000–2005: Attempts to relaunch the MAFF pilot 
process  
2000–2002:  
Sofitex initiative 
In 2000, Sofitex advisory services were thrown into crisis: 
farmers faced problems with soil fertility decline that the 
advisors could not solve. The advisors felt incompetent and 
thus demotivated. With support from researchers, Sofitex 
relaunched a process of piloting the MAFF approach through 
a three-year project funded by the EU through its Stabex 
programs.3  
Through this project advisory tools were improved, placing 
emphasis on advice relating to cotton production standards. 
Ten cotton advisors were trained in the MAFF method and 
tools, and ten villages were targeted. Voluntary groups were 
established within GPCs. The true testing of the MAFF 
approach could not be completed, however, because 
Sofitex’s lack of will hindered the implementation of an 
evaluation and monitoring system. Also, no formal role was 
assigned to UNPCB, in spite of its involvement in the process 
from the beginning. 
2003–2005:  
New AFD support for training and capacity-building  
In 2003, positive results reported at the departmental level 
convinced UNPCB and Sofitex to propose operational 
guidelines to implement and scale-up use of the MAFF 
approach. The planned activities included training new 
advisors, capacity-building of supervisors, and FO capacity-
                                                          
2
 The PA-OPA project ran from 1997 to 2000, and was followed 
by PA-OPC, from 2001 to 2004 (Project for providing support for 
the professionalization of cotton producers organizations; in 
French, Projet d’appui à la professionnalisation des organisations 
de producteurs de coton), and then by PRFCB from 2006 to 2009 
(Project for strengthening the cotton sector in Burkina Faso; in 
French, Projet de renforcement de la filière cotonnière 
burkinabè); the latter project continued until 2012. 
3
 Stabex (Système de stabilisation des recettes d'exportation) is 
the acronym for a European Commission compensatory finance 
scheme to stabilize export earnings of ACP countries.  
Cotton Producer Organizations in Burkina Faso – The Capacity of Farmer Organizations to Provide EAS 
[7] 
building, such that advisory services could be better 
implemented and monitored. Through the PA-OPC project, 
AFD agreed to finance research and training support for three 
years. About 30 MAFF advisors and 30 managers and 
supervisors were trained. Farm typologies were produced for 
all cotton areas, for use in familiarizing advisors with rural 
realities and the functioning of different farm types. 
Approximately 100 farmer groups were constituted, 
representing 1500 producers. Extension workers were 
enrolled to work with the groups, and group steering 
committees were created at each level, to facilitate 
monitoring.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 4: Relationships between cotton producers’ organizations and the cotton company 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Despite the investments in these organizational components, 
MAFF implementation failed. The UNPCB could not make the 
steering committees function. The lack of goals, skills and 
knowledge-sharing between the MAFF CPOs and Sofitex were 
identified as key problems. In addition, the EAS coordinator 
was based at the national union headquarters, and was not 
well informed about the mistakes in MAFF implementation 
on the ground.  
Within Sofitex, the status of MAFF advisors led to many 
problems. MAFF advisors were paid the same as cotton 
advisors, who were less qualified and had fewer 
responsibilities and activities. At the same time that the 
MAFF advisor were added, institutional reforms within 
Sofitex led to a decrease in the number of employees, 
especially field workers. Moreover, the managers of the two 
new private cotton firms (Fasocoton and Socoma) operating 
in the eastern portion of the country (see Figure 3) started 
recruiting some of the newly trained Sofitex MAFF advisors to 
build up the capacities of the new cotton firms. 
Stage 4. 2007–2012: A whole project focused on EAS 
implementation 
On the basis of the practical experience gained by Sofitex and 
the MAFF CPOs, AFD finally agreed to finance full 
implementation of the MAFF approach within the framework 
of the Project for strengthening the cotton sector in Burkina 
Faso (Projet de renforcement de la filière cotonnière 
burkinabè, PRFCB). Costs were divided into three parts, with 
portions allocated to the state, UNPCB and the cotton firms. 
The project was expected to implement EAS (organizational 
and technical aspects), and establish a truly endogenous 
funding scheme. Unfortunately, new problems arose that 
again hindered MAFF implementation. This time, the cotton 
price crisis and the empowerment of CPOs were the main 
causes. In 2012, the project came to a standstill. 
2007–2009:  
Sofitex immobility and UNPCB claims 
No activities took place during the first two years. The 
stakeholders themselves struggled to explain the reasons for 
this. No doubt one reason was that the MAFF 
implementation became a strategic tool whose control 
Sofitex was not willing to cede to UNPCB. MAFF became a 
sensitive topic for the cotton firm, especially in the context of 
the cotton crisis. After a decade of remarkable growth in 
cotton production (1996–2006), falling international 
cottonseed prices and increasing input prices led to farmers 
and private firms becoming disenchanted with the sector. 
Numerous organizational failures emerged, the causes of 
which were poorly understood at the various levels of the 
organizations. Disagreements arose between UNPCB and 
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Sofitex, relating to the EAS goals, available human and 
financial resources, the enrolment of farmer extension 
workers, and the involvement of CPOs in implementation and 
monitoring. During this period, relations between UNPCB and 
Sofitex were also undermined by a maize commercialization 
initiative launched by UNPCB. This initiative was undertaken 
in response to farmers’ needs for a viable cash crop, and led 
to land being taken out of cotton production and put into 
maize, resulting in the removal of UNPCB’s president from 
office. Meanwhile, UPPCs and UDPCs were poorly informed 
of the negotiations taking place at the national level.  
At the same time, new MAFF pilots were underway in the 
region, led by other donors (SNV and Agriculteurs Français et 
Développement International, AFDI). SNV, in its 
implementation of the MAFF approach, contracted with 
UDPCs and UPPCs that were trying to find solutions to their 
members’ problems, in particular those relating to soil 
fertility. The SNV project focused on local CPO capacity-
building and the training of farmers as extension workers. 
SNV used a popular form of teacher training – the cascade 
model – which enables many extension workers and 
participants to be reached in a short time.  
Through these experiences, Sofitex became increasingly 
convinced about the pitfalls of engaging in the joint 
provisioning of advisory services with CPOs: the changes in 
the status of advisors did not produce the intended results. 
According to Sofitex, UNPCB seemed to be reaping the 
rewards of the company’s work. Whereas the increasing 
number of MAFF pilots obscured and masked Sofitex 
activities. The advisory activities of these various projects are 
represented in Figure . 
 
 
Figure 5: The hodgepodge of advisory services provided to 
cotton producers 
 
2009–2012:  
Under donor pressure, advisory services are finally 
implemented within a (flawed) framework 
It was not until 2009 that a MAFF governance scheme was 
set up based on recommendations from external experts. 
MAFF activities started in villages in 2010. UNPCB was, for 
the first time, officially in charge of monitoring, managing 
and accounting.  
Joint steering committees (involving CPO representatives and 
cotton firm agents) were set up at each level. As the UDPCs 
and UPPCs had not previously been involved in MAFF design 
and pilots, and their roles had not been clearly defined, they 
encountered difficulties with MAFF implementation. 
Consequently, Sofitex retained control over the monitoring of 
field operations. Around 15 MAFF advisors trained 168 
groups, with a total of 3000 participating farmers. Farmer 
extension workers were not recruited; thus the system has 
not been scaled-up to reach more families. 
2.4 Separation between CPOs and cotton firms for a 
reconfiguration of EAS 
An external audit carried out at the end of 2012 noted 
numerous failures and recommended an overhaul of the EAS 
through a separation between CPOs and private firms. 
However, this separation was not implemented since donors 
viewed the partnership between these stakeholders as a key 
element in providing EAS.  
For Sofitex, the lessons learned were clear. The partnership 
with UNPCB prevented them from improving governance and 
methods responding to their own needs. Transaction costs of 
implementing the MAFFapproach were too high for the 
benefits accrued. Sofitex advisors could not manage to 
perform all their tasks properly: gathering data at the farm 
level, analyzing the functioning of farms, facilitating collective 
discussions and exchanges, disseminating standard 
knowledge on cotton production, etc. From their perspective, 
the steering committees were useless and CPOs didn’t 
provide any input that was useful to MAFF implementation.  
Sofitex developed a vision for the CPOs’ future role in a 
renewed, jointly managed EAS system: providing farmer 
extension workers and providing EAS for specialist niches, 
such as organically grown cotton, conservation agriculture, or 
financial management of local groups. According to this 
vision, the advice provided should stay focused on core 
technical issues so that cotton production will not be 
jeopardized.  
For its part, UNPCB remains somewhat confused. Although 
aware of its own weaknesses, the organization finds it 
difficult to bring about comprehensive and far-reaching 
changes. It has always served in a subordinate role, which 
prevented it from undertaking autonomous decision-making 
and development. MAFF implementation has highlighted 
contradictions that UNPCB was forced to face: the challenge 
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of how to defend producers’ interests while simultaneously 
reinforcing growth of the cotton sector. The partnership with 
Sofitex led UNPCB to become disconnected from its own 
members, thus further preventing it from building its own 
strategic vision. The lessons that UNPCB can draw from the 
experience are yet not clear. UNPCB has established a 
national network that is attempting to draw lessons from the 
data, experiences and evaluation of MAFF implementation 
over the past ten years. At present, UNPCB is still considering 
the different scenarios for change that have been proposed 
by the external audit. 
2.5 Perspectives from another model of EAS delivery 
tested with a local CPO 
SNV first started experimenting with the MAFF approach in 
2002, in addressing farmers’ soil fertility problems. Until 
2006, the approach used consisted of setting up EASs at the 
departmental level with UDPC. Subsequently, UPPC were 
included in the governance scheme in order to improve 
coordination and achieve sustainable self-financing.  
The EAS model designed and tested by SNV is referred to as 
endogenous because it only uses farmer extension workers, 
within a cascade training system. In designing the advisory 
services provided through this model, SNV’s approach 
ensured they were tailored to suit the available human and 
financial resources. This approach differs from that used in 
the AFD project in several ways:  
 It is demand-driven, designed to be appropriate at the 
local level (departmental unions and GPCs). 
 The advice offered is focused on subsistence issues, 
income improvement and problem solving through 
exchanges and discussions. 
 It includes direct payment of the farmer extension 
workers and supervisors by the beneficiaries themselves 
(see Table 2 for a more complete comparison). 
Despite a few lacunae (notably, delays in payment, lack of 
commitment, and lack of strong day-to-day support), this 
experience demonstrated that efficient EAS, based on an 
overall approach of whole-farm functioning, management 
tools and peer exchanges contributed to great improvement 
at the individual level and was affordable by CPOs.  
 
3. Lessons Learned 
The experiences CPOs participating in the delivery of 
extension and advisory services to their members highlight 
several lessons regarding (i) the pathways for designing EAS 
in a multi-stakeholders process, (ii) the “best fit” MAFF 
method, and (iii) the key attributes that CPOs must have in 
order to provide financially sustainable EAS. 
3.1 Pathways for designing sustainable EAS in a multi-
stakeholder, project-funded process 
In both cases, the main lesson learned was that experimental 
EAS implementation should not be disconnected from a 
planned strategic vision for the co-evolution of FO capacity-
building and EAS goals. In the absence of such a strategic 
vision, the timing of the project, the donors’ own strategies 
and their understanding of key issues may override the 
endogenous design process. Facing the urgency to “do 
something” in the project framework, stakeholders (i.e., FOs 
and private firms) established uncomfortable compromises 
on most of the key issues (i.e., costs and supervision of EAS), 
which then later impedes the introduction of improvements 
in EAS provisioning. The system is essentially locked (see 
Figure 6), which leads to an advisory mechanism that cannot 
be appropriated by either the CPOs or the cotton firms and is 
thus unsustainable. 
The AFD project had many ambitious goals: reinforcement of 
the cotton sector through the empowerment of CPOs; testing 
of MAFF methods; experimenting with co-managed EAS. 
Whereas UNPCB and Sofitex were learning to work together 
faced the cotton crisis, the EAS management scheme had to 
be developed under project pressure. These pressures led to 
the management of EAS being modeled on the management 
of other services (i.e., inputs and credit supply) provided by 
the UNPCB. Steering committees and procedural controls 
were set up at each level (GPC, UDPC, UPPC, UNPCB), yet this 
raised questions about the pertinence of such a governance 
structure for EAS and the suitability of GPCs also serving as 
groups of MAFF participants. 
The absence of guidelines for each committee underlined the 
fact that their respective roles and responsibilities were not 
carefully considered. The SNV approach, in contrast, started 
first at the lower level (UDPCs), which led to a precise 
identification of the role of the upper level UPPCs. This 
experience also showed that increased control over funds 
was necessary to allow self-financing through the 
reinvestment of cotton taxes into EAS.  
The adequacy of GPCs to act as MAFF participant groups can 
also be questioned. These groups were created in order to 
provide a joint guarantee on the amounts received as input 
credit. Many farmers who were excluded from these groups 
found themselves without access to EAS. These groups have 
a high degree of heterogeneity in terms of learning capacities 
and needs. Group composition and interaction between 
groups should be reconsidered in order to improve MAFF 
impacts. 
The decision to co-manage EAS provisioning meant that 
steering committees consisted of agents of cotton firms, 
elected representatives from CPOs and technicians. It 
appeared that the management focus on the multi-
stakeholder committees prevented thorough discussions and 
exchanges within the CPOs, which, if it had occurred, may 
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have enabled them to build their strategic vision based on 
field results. The CPOs were effectively missing opportunities 
for internal dialogue and organizational learning. Their time 
was mainly spent on the participating farmers targeted 
through MAFF implementation in GPCs. Steering committees 
were used to solve logistical problems as they arose, but 
were unable to recommend strategic changes that could 
have helped improve the EAS.  
Moreover, the cotton crisis induced many farmers to switch 
to growing cereals such as maize or rice. The cotton firms 
became apprehensive that MAFF would only strengthen this 
process by providing economic advice to farmers. This helps 
to explain the lack of genuine political will on the part of the 
cotton firms to support the scaling-up of the MAFF pilots. 
These pilots remained limited, embedded within the broader 
technical support services of the firms and MAFF 
implementation remained a secondary activity for cotton 
advisors. The dissemination of standard techno-economic 
information on cotton production remained the main 
purpose of the EAS.  
 
Table 2. Comparison of MAFF design processes, characteristics of the operational mechanisms and sustainability 
Experimental model Endogenous problem-oriented EAS  Jointly implemented solution-oriented EAS 
Donor SNV AFD 
Beneficiaries Departmental unions (UDPCs) and provincial 
unions (UPPCs) 
National Union (UNPCB) and Sofitex 
Donors’ global 
objectives 
 
Strengthen FO capacities and sustainability of 
farms  
Strengthen cotton sector 
Open discussions between private firms and farmers 
Support sustainability of cotton producers 
Intervention attitude Accompanying Directive 
Primary farmer 
organization (FO) 
motivations 
MAFF seen as a means to solve productivity 
problems at the farm level 
Collaborate with cotton firms 
MAFF seen as a strategic means to defend producer 
interests in discussion with private firms 
EAS implementation  
Duration 2 phases: 2002–2006; 2007–2011 4 phases between 1993 and 2012 
Stakeholders CPOs (UPPCs, UDPCs, GPCs), SNV, contract out 
with local capacity builder 
Demand-driven 
Cotton firms, CPOs (UNPCB, UDPCs, UPPCs, GPCs), 
AFD, research 
Supply-driven 
Management system Management by UPPCs 
Implementation by UDPCs 
 
Co-management between cotton firms and UNPCB. 
Steering committee at lower levels (UPPCs, UDPCs) 
for implementation 
Operational system (front-office and back-office)  
Method used Simplified MAFF methods with adaptations in 
order to take into account the nature of farmers’ 
problems 
Oriented toward problem-solving 
MAFF methods with adaptations for technical issues 
(cotton-oriented advice) 
Standard orientation toward dissemination of 
technical knowledge 
Human resources and 
skills 
Exclusively uses farmer extension workers 
recruited from GPCs and UDPCs 
Professional advisor (with an engineering degree) 
recruited by Sofitex 
Number of extension 
workers 
385 21 
Number of participating 
farmers 
1934 5117 
(2% of cotton producers) 
Cost €11/farmer participant €134/farmer participant 
Sustainability issues 
(stakeholder 
perspective): 
 Lack of scruples in terms of EAS governance, 
fund transparency and EAS coordination 
with other services (e.g., supply of seeds 
and information); 
 Lack of continuity due to turnover of 
elected officials and advisors; 
 Need for financial contribution from UNPCB in 
order to remain a partner in jointly implemented 
EAS system; 
 Need for specifying EAS goals in order to 
improve governance scheme and receive 
endorsement of the cotton firm. 
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Other obstacles to a full commitment by Sofitex to the MAFF 
approach were linked to the co-management scheme. 
Negotiations with UNPCB concerning the co-management of 
funds led to high transaction costs that were not 
commensurate with the tangible results. As a result, the 
cotton firms preferred their own command-and-control 
system to manage field operations and to orient the 
assignments of the extension workers. 
If EAS systems are to be enhanced through external projects, 
greater attention needs to be paid to the building a shared 
vision of EAS goals and to the timing of capacity-building for 
stakeholders. EAS implementation is not just a matter of 
experimenting with an advisory method, it must also involve 
the adoption of new institutional arrangements and 
management approaches. As such, project evaluation criteria 
should also take into account the correlation between the 
capacity-building of the FO and the implementation of the 
EAS. Using this approach, evaluation data on the impact at 
the farm-level are essential to help FOs appreciate the value 
of the EAS system, improve their management and build a 
strategic vision. Within the SNV project, for example, impact 
studies carried out after the first phase of the project served 
as the basis for improving activities during the second phase. 
These studies proved to be very valuable in convincing both 
external donors and the elected representatives of the FOs to 
invest more time in MAFF development. Within the AFD 
project, on the other hand, the absence of tangible evidence 
of positive impacts on cotton production provided the basis 
of the cotton firm refusing to scale-up MAFF implementation.  
In conclusion, interventions of external donors that serve to 
accompany, as opposed to direct, local partners appeared to 
be much more suitable. The priority therefore is to build on 
FOs’ strengths and create meaningful results in order to 
initiate EAS ownership by FOs. In addition, the timing and 
activities of projects should follow the organizational and 
technical learning pathways of the FOs. This implies: 
 giving time to take stock of the initial results, in order to 
build a shared vision of EAS goals and to reconsider the 
management system before scaling-up; 
 creating opportunities for internal exchanges and for 
building a strategic vision; 
 according more importance to impact evaluations, which 
are needed to (a) help build a strategic vision, 
(b) improve the management system, and (c) convince 
not only the FO itself of the benefits of providing EAS but 
also convince donors to invest funds and time; 
 adapting project evaluation criteria in order to link the 
EAS governance scheme to improvement in farmers’ 
welfare and the FO’s performance. 
It may be concluded from the foregoing that development 
assistance faces quite a task in rethinking how to lead such 
projects. Normally, generic advisory methods are selected 
and established at the beginning of a project to ease rapid 
implementation. Since, as we have seen from the AFD and 
SNV examples, EAS delivery in strongly context-driven, the 
selection of features of EAS programs should be carried out 
in the process of establishing a locally adapted EAS system. 
 
Figure 6: EAS system seen as a temporary institutionalized and locked compromise 
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3.2 Strategies to overcome CPO weaknesses in extension 
and advisory service implementation 
The second lesson is that CPOs’ weaknesses can be overcome 
using an endogenous EAS development process. Endogenous 
EAS entails using the complementarities of endogenous skills, 
calling upon local external expertise and using advisory 
methods as tools for strengthening capacities throughout the 
entire organization. 
Extension workers and managers cited numerous FO 
weaknesses that impeded effective EAS implementation, 
including: 
 the lack of transparency in the management of funds 
received from the sales of cotton, which prevented 
planning for self-financed EAS; 
 insufficient involvement of elected representatives, 
which led to the lack of strategic decisions to adapt EAS 
to members’ needs and FOs’ capacities (this lack of 
involvement is due to the high rate of turnover of 
elected representatives, and the fact that their 
knowledge and management capacities are inadequate 
to deal with EAS challenges); 
 the lack of honesty and inadequate skills of advisors, 
which led to demotivation of participating farmers;  
 the lack of capacity to mobilize new partnerships in 
responding to FO needs, i.e., to integrate exchange 
networks or use local expertise to build sustainable 
solutions to their organizational or technical problems; 
and 
 the large turnover of FO employees and elected 
representatives, which slowed down the process of EAS 
appropriation. 
The following attributes relating to the internal organization 
of FOs and their external relationships emerged as important 
ways of overcoming these weaknesses: 
 giving more attention to the link between elected 
representatives and the advisors;  
 ensuring that those with complementary skills work 
more closely together; 
 calling upon additional local expertise whenever 
necessary; 
 stimulating flexibility and innovation in EAS 
implementation; 
 using EAS as a core tool to the design all FO services and 
activities; and 
 targeting focused initiatives in order to “scale-out” the 
local model (i.e., apply the same local adapted model in 
other locations, carried out by other FOs, instead of 
increasing the number of FOs applying unique EAS 
systems), and thus avoid the pitfalls normally associated 
with scaling-up diverse elements of local experience. 
Internal relationships should be better taken into 
consideration 
In order to face the high costs of advisor training and wages, 
and also to increase internal EAS management capacities, 
complementarities between skills must be sought at two 
levels: between technicians and elected representatives, and 
between professional advisors and farmer extension workers, 
through the strengthening of internal relationships. 
One of the most valuable benefits from the MAFF pilots lay in 
the training of elected representatives. All of them attended 
MAFF courses and increased their management capacities 
considerably. In consequence, they now feel more capable of 
proposing an EAS strategic vision. They also forged closer 
relationships with their technicians, who are generally better 
educated. Technicians mentioned that elected representative 
learned how to plan activities and that discussions during 
steering committee meetings subsequently became much 
more interesting. These changes helped to improve the 
overall decision-making processes within the organization.  
Technicians also learnt a lot from MAFF implementation. 
They increased their understanding of farmers’ difficulties; 
something not taught at school. After two or three years of 
working as advisors, they became capable of delivering 
advice useful to farmers and were able to improve extension 
field methods by themselves.   
In general, advisors learn quickly and FOs benefit from their 
increased knowledge of rural realities. In the AFD project, 
since all the advisors belonged to an external private firm, 
advisor capacity-building did not reinforce FO capacities. In 
fact, UNPCB lost touch with its own membership, becoming 
unable to respond to their needs. Therefore, advisors must 
be part of FOs in order to construct FO capacities and EAS 
system. 
In short, management training of elected representatives and 
their in-depth interactions between technicians emerged as 
key aspects in strengthening FO capacities to deliver EAS. 
Complementarities with local skills should be sought 
Exploiting complementarities with the skills of extension 
workers Complementarities of skills between professional 
advisors and farmer extension workers should also be 
exploited. In the SNV project, the absence of professional 
advisors made it difficult to find innovative solutions to 
problems faced by farmers. In the AFD project, in the 
absence of farmer extension workers, professional advisors 
found it difficult to understand local social issues in the 
different villages, speak the local languages or to maintain 
participatory dynamics within farmer groups. In contrast, in 
the SNV project the continuous presence of farmer extension 
workers in the village played a major role in maintaining 
participation and thus had more of an impact on processes of 
change at the farm level.  
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Exploiting local external expertise. The ad hoc training of all 
the extension workers involved in each project was very 
expensive and is, moreover, not replicable. Two low-cost 
solutions have been found to counter problems arising in the 
course of EAS implementation: exchanges of experience 
among FO networks and the use of local expertise 
(i.e., retired senior advisors, associations specialized in 
learning methods) or local training courses at engineering 
schools or universities. 
Use flexible approaches 
As MAFF is not a standardized approach to solving problems, 
some advisors felt free to develop supplemental learning 
tools and thematic issues. In this way, MAFF became a better 
fit with members’ needs, advisors’ skills and financial 
resources. Particularly with regards to funding, flexibility in 
MAFF implementation offers the potential of greater 
sustainability. 
Place EAS at the core of service delivery at the FO level 
Many extension workers and elected representatives 
recognized that the MAFF approach was a powerful tool to 
diagnose farmer needs and identify room for maneuver in 
improving other services provided by the FO. Within such an 
orientation, the delivery of EAS need not be disconnected 
from other services. 
Scale-out locally-rooted models of EAS  
The limited ability of FOs to manage large numbers of 
workers and large amounts of funding means that small-scale 
operational systems, at very local levels, are preferable. Use 
of scale-appropriate systems enables FOs to stay close to 
farmer concerns and to build a locally-rooted governance 
scheme. Scaling-up therefore should not be understood as an 
increase in the number of advisors within the same 
governance scheme, which would overwhelm FOs, but rather 
as the scaling-out of well-suited and appropriately sized local 
models to other locations and organizations.  
3.3 The “best fit” of MAFF methods 
Comparing the two different project contexts (AFD and SNV 
pilots) improves our understanding of the “best fit” of MAFF 
EAS delivery. In one pilot (SNV) EAS was delivered by FOs, 
and in the other (AFD) by a private company (see Figure ). 
The MAFF approach appears to be a well-suited method for 
FOs that are in the process of forming. Moreover, due to 
major ecological and economic changes, farmers’ needs will 
evolve and FOs require participatory tools, such as those 
offered through the MAFF approach, to identify problems 
and build solutions with their members. In the pilot projects 
the MAFF approach was appreciated for three reasons: (1) it 
teaches the use of management tools, (2) it creates 
opportunities for collective exchanges on problems and 
solutions, and (3) it uses a systemic approach to farm 
management. Once extension workers master the core 
principles, they are able to develop tools and training courses 
adapted to local situations (taking both social issues and 
agricultural production problems into account). 
In contrast, MAFF did not fulfill the needs of private firms 
since the problems they faced were much more straight 
forward technical issues. The dissemination of standard 
information and solutions fit better with their objectives. The 
need for more immediate economic returns on their 
investments is also an obstacle to the adoption of innovative 
methods that have human capital strengthening as their goal. 
Put somewhat differently, it is inappropriate for farmers and 
advisors to assess the MAFF approach only in terms of its 
impact on cotton production. The promotion of cost-benefit 
evaluation studies would be a way of indirectly maintaining 
the involvement of private firms in EAS that is oriented 
toward capacity-building. 
 
 
Figure 7: Core advisory services of farmer organizations and 
private firms  
Source: Adapted from Labarthe & Laurent, 2011. 
3.4 CPO capacities and key attributes needed in 
providing advisory services 
Based on the lessons outlined above, we identify three 
dimensions of CPO capacities that are necessary for the 
sustainable delivery of EAS: 
 the capacity to organize and implement 
services that can meet farmers’ needs; 
 the capacity to internalize issues, costs and 
management, and sustain them beyond project 
funding or pilot projects; and 
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 the capacity to make these EAS beneficial in 
terms of the capacity-building of the 
organization itself. 
The experiences in MAFF implementation highlight key FO 
characteristics that should be targeted in order to strengthen 
their capacity to serve members’ needs (see Figure 7). FOs 
are characterized by three main dimensions: their internal 
organization, their relationships with external actors, and 
their services and activities (Rigourd et al., 2008). FOs 
internal organization is related to their identity, scope, vision 
and strategies. Procedural and governance systems are 
included in this dimension. Relationships with the outside 
world determine a FO’s legitimacy, power, autonomy and 
nature of partnerships. Other services (other than EAS) 
include all other activities, products and technical know-how 
that FOs provide or make available to their members, in the 
suitability and effectiveness of these services. 
The capacity to organize and implement demand-driven EAS 
calls for true coordination among all related services and 
initiatives in order to better respond to farmer needs. It also 
requires appropriate balance between development of 
individual skills and collective endeavors. The ability to fully 
capitalize on potential EAS contributions requires the ability 
to monitor and assess EAS impacts. It is also necessary to 
take another look at the nature of partners. The capacity to 
sustain EAS beyond pilot projects calls for more complete 
absorption of EAS issues by elected representatives and the 
adoption of cost-reduction strategies. In the short term, the 
exchange of solutions and strategies among FOs through a 
regional FO network is one approach. Taking advantage of 
existing training courses to avoid duplication and an ad hoc 
approach to training is another. 
 
 
Figure 7: Key features and capacities of FOs in providing 
sustainable advisory services (AS) 
 
4. Critical Issues That Need to be Addressed 
The assessment of the capacity of farmer organizations FOs 
to provide extension and advisory services (EAS) cannot be 
separated from the advisory method selected and from the 
institutional and socioeconomic contexts in which they 
operate. To look beyond the context of the cotton sector and 
experiences in MAFF implementation three key issues are 
addressed in this section.  
4.1 How can EAS help farmer organizations to insert 
themselves into value chains, and thus become more 
sustainable?  
Extrapolating from CPO experiments with EAS provisioning is 
difficult because of their specific history with private cotton 
firms. This institutional dependency (as depicted in Figure 6.) 
has made it very difficult to effect any change in the EAS 
governance structures and implementation. It is interesting 
to note that the recently created cotton firms seem to be 
much more dynamic and willing to try out new activities with 
cotton producers. For instance, they have begun to orient 
EAS toward conservation agriculture trials and support. 
However, the question arises as to the relevance of these FOs 
to various stakeholders. They remain embedded in 
production chains, but still have limited impact on increasing 
product values (at least, not enough impact to be recognized 
by private firms as valuable partners), yet are hampered in 
their ability to respond to boarder interests of members by 
financial limitations.  
The provisioning of EAS by the FOs could serve not only as a 
means for increasing production and improving product 
quality, but also for enhancing the sustainability of 
production; for instance, through the promotion of more 
ecologically friendly practices. FOs will certainly gain more 
visibility and become more effective if advisory methods 
clearly address at least one of these recognized goals. 
Moreover, becoming qualified EAS providers appears to be 
necessary in order advantage of funding opportunities or to 
attract private firms as partners, investors or as buyers of 
agricultural products. But, in such cases, EAS will inevitably 
end up satisfying the interests of firms before those of 
farmers. 
As long as private firms want to handle technical advice by 
themselves, FOs should invent new ways of providing EAS to 
members. Either they should assume the role of facilitators 
or mediators, to help farmers trust the interventions of the 
private firm, or they should find other ways to satisfy 
farmers’ needs, according to their specific skills and 
capacities. 
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4.2 Are there other sustainable roles for advisory 
services provided by farmer organizations? 
The experiments with the MAFF method have shown very 
interesting results, revealing the capacity of farmers to 
improve their livelihoods to a large extent thanks to 
improved management practices at the farm level (Lauby 
Samadoulougou, 2011). In this case, the role of EAS for family 
farms is to provide information that supports organizational 
and technical changes. This improved knowledge contributes 
to reducing uncertainty, thus improving each farmer’s 
capacity to innovate (Labarthe, 2010). 
The MAFF approach opens up a new path, inviting us to 
rethink the creation of added value by FOs. The current 
strength of FOs lies in their ability to mobilize the efforts of 
farmers and express farmers’ concerns through service 
relationships, which are built on trust and joint action. The 
creation of added value could become the core of this service 
relationship, through the co-production of innovative 
solutions to farmers’ problems. The FOs could act as 
innovation brokers, by linking external opportunities to 
farmer needs, exploring innovative production systems, 
strengthening farmers’ learning and innovation capacities. In 
this way, the FO role could switch from a “compulsory 
partner for reaching farmers” to a “key partner for change 
and innovation”.  
This perspective requires innovative inputs on MAFF methods 
in order to better incorporate information and knowledge 
production and management issues at both the farm and the 
FO levels. We know that sharing problems, solutions and 
knowledge is a fundamental prerequisite for initiating joint 
innovation processes at the farm level. Sharing in this manner 
helps turn tacit understanding into explicit knowledge and 
thus leads to the strengthening of farmers’ skills. FOs could 
play a crucial role in facilitating essential interactions for skills 
appropriation (Lundvall, 2005). These kinds of activities 
would be less expensive than recruiting numerous specialized 
advisors. For example, think-tank platforms called clubs-
conseils en agroenvironnement have been established in the 
Canadian city of Quebec and appear to be very effective. 
They bring farmers together to discuss important issues such 
as rules for value chains, integration of new know-how at the 
farm level, the role for farmers in territorial development, 
etc. The FOs are also able to provide a collective framework 
that enhances the production of new knowledge and 
innovations (Fillipi & Triboulet, 2006). 
To proceed further with such “learning and innovation 
services” requires new partnerships and financing 
mechanisms. FOs need to get closer to non-market 
stakeholders and existing learning systems, including public 
services, educational systems, research, as well as FO 
networks or firms with expertise in human resource 
management, skills reinforcement or learning methods. 
Financing mechanisms should be explored with FO members, 
giving consideration to the beneficiaries’ willingness and 
ability to pay. For instance, in the context of rural 
electrification projects in developing countries, funding 
schemes based on farmer payments have been found to be 
successful, since electricity supply is perceived as an essential 
service.  
Learning-oriented EAS systems seem to be much more within 
the FOs’ reach than market-oriented activities. In any case, 
the impact of market-oriented activities driven by FOs will be 
limited because of the lack of state regulation and support 
(Blein & Coronel, 2013). Learning-oriented EAS, on the other 
hand, require FOs to mobilize their main capital (i.e., human 
and social capital) and skills (i.e., creating trust and collective 
dynamics among local communities), giving them much more 
room for maneuver. Knowledge should become a new asset 
of the FOs.  
4.3 What lessons are needed to help stakeholders 
highlight the distinctive features and roles of advisory 
services provided by farmer organizations? 
In the context of the restructuring of the agricultural sector 
FOs face numerous challenges. First, the SNVACAs continue 
to be oriented toward the dissemination of technical 
information as a solution to rural development challenges, 
despite professing an increased focus on innovation 
processes and local knowledge. The decision to recruit 
hundreds of extension agents and make them work directly 
with farmers looks very much like the previous extension 
system – which has been shown to have many limitations.  
While FOs perceive that the state’s agenda favors technical 
advice – which is viewed as more favorable for agri-
businessmen and private firms – others highlight the 
difficulty of implementing innovation systems effectively 
because this requires bringing together many different 
stakeholders (researchers, advisory-service providers, NGOs, 
farmer organizations and private-sector actors) and making 
them work together in a specific way (Nederlof et al., 2011). 
Moving beyond the usual triad of farmer, extension worker 
and researcher is difficult. Operational schemes are sorely 
lacking. How can we enhance interactions among 
stakeholders to change the way their organizations function 
and collaborate with others? What should be supported and 
paid for by the state?  
When the functions and functioning of FOs are examined 
more closely, it becomes clear that FOs have much to do with 
innovation platforms. Because FOs address complex 
situations, they take into account farmers’ needs and 
capacities, they act as intermediaries between actors who 
are not used to working together (e.g., banks, agro-industry, 
researchers, NGOs, farmers), and they create spaces for 
discussion, action, sharing and learning. Moreover, when 
implementing EAS, FOs tend to improve farming practices 
through joint experimentation and by linking farmers to 
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markets and other stakeholders. All these features have been 
identified as characteristics of an innovation platform 
(Hounkonnou et al., 2011).  
We may wonder why FOs should be part of the national 
advisory system as EAS providers. The answer lies, as 
previously mentioned, in their main assets – human, social 
and local knowledge. They are uniquely positioned to play a 
greater role in structuring and pushing through innovation 
processes in rural areas. For this reason, EAS, which are “co-
learning approaches” for capacity strengthening (Figure 7), 
should be explored in greater depth. 
For instance, in cotton-growing areas, much more attention 
should be paid to research on alternative production systems 
that consume less expensive phyto-sanitary inputs and 
conserve soil fertility. Agro-ecology, integrated pest 
management and sustainable intensification could all be key 
issues around which FOs can be key partners, both because 
sustainability is improved with collective action and because 
agricultural innovation requires the fostering and sharing of 
local knowledge. EAS delivered by FOs could be a learning 
and innovation process for farmers, for the FOs themselves 
and for the FOs’ external partners.  
However, viable economic models still remain to be found. 
Experience so far has shown that public funding for 
development programs is often not sustainable and we 
should not expect the case of EAS to be an exception. The 
establishment of regional or national development funds, or 
funding by sectors that already implement compulsory 
contributions at the marketing stage (such as the case of the 
cotton sector in Burkina Faso) offer more promising 
possibilities.  
Moreover, the structuring of federated organizations, the 
evolution of the legal framework (OHADA Law) and the 
flourishing of private firms require that the FOs clarify their 
role and eventually change their functions and restructure 
their internal organization to conform to the laws. In this 
framework, the future of EAS seems to be a matter of 
negotiation between economic stakeholders. For instance, in 
the cotton sector, EAS have traditionally been handled only 
by companies. Nevertheless, official policies may be changed 
partially or even completely through lessons learned from 
MAFF pilots with CPOs. In the case of Burkina Faso, a lot will 
depend on the capacity of UNPCB to defend and project its 
achievements and core strengths. 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, more lessons are needed on the different 
viable local models for the provision of EAS by farmer 
organizations. Models need to be capable of responding to 
the economic, environmental and social challenges, within 
the laws and policies that affect the structure and functions 
of FOs. Attention should be paid to the larger issue of the 
role of FOs in innovation processes, related to knowledge 
production and bridging capacities that can lead to economic 
and social development. Local and small-scale pilot projects 
should preferably be implemented and monitored, with a 
strong focus on letting stakeholders operate in a self-directed 
manner, according to their respective capacities and goals.  
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Where appropriate, an official English translation has been 
provided, with the original French name in brackets. 
AFD French Agency for Development [Agence 
Française de Développement] 
AFDI French Agriculturists and International 
Development [Agriculteurs Français et 
Développement International] 
EAS Extension and advisory services 
CFDT Compagnie Française pour le Développement 
des Fibres Textiles 
CIRAD French Agricultural Research Centre for 
International Development [Centre de 
coopération Internationale en Recherche 
Agronomique pour le Développement] 
CPO cotton producer organization 
CRPA Regional Centre for Agro-pastoral Promotion 
[Centre Régional de Promotion Agro-pastorale]  
Fasocoton Société cotonnière du Faso 
FO farmer organization 
GPC Cotton producers group [groupe de producteurs 
de coton] 
GVs Village groups [groupements villageois] 
INERA National Institute for the Environment and 
Agricultural Research of Burkina Faso [Institut 
National de l’Environnement et de Recherches 
Agricoles de Burkina Faso) 
MAFF management advice for family farms 
NGO nongovernmental organization 
OHADA Organization for the Harmonization of Business 
Law in Africa [Organisation pour 
l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des 
Affaires] 
PO Producers organization 
RG Management Network (network of advisory-
service POs) [Réseau Gestion] 
SNV Netherlands Development Organisation 
SNVACA National System for Agricultural Extension and 
Advisory Services [Systeme National de 
Vulgarisation et d'Appui Conseil Agricole] 
Sofitex Burkina Faso Textile Fiber Company [Société 
Burkinabè des Fibres Textiles] 
Socoma Société cotonnière du Gourma 
UDPC Departmental Union of Cotton Producers [Union 
Départementale des Producteurs de Coton] 
UNPCB 
 
National Union of Cotton Producers of Burkina 
[Union Nationale des Producteurs de Coton du 
Burkina] 
UPPC Provincial Union of Cotton Producers [Union 
Provinciale des Producteurs de Coton]  
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